INTRODUCTION

1. ASSESSING GALILEAN EXPLANATIONS

• 1.1 Explanatory Goals Concerning Metaethics
• 1.2 General Standards

2. SELECTIVELY LIMITED GALILEANISM

• 2.1 Persistent Anthropocentrism
• 2.2 Mistaken Essentialism
• 2.3 Emphasis on Current Environment

3. WARNING SIGNS FOR PSEUDO-GALILEANISM

• 3.1 Outmoded Theory: The Brain and Judgment
• 3.2 Overlooking Straightforward Evolutionary Explanations
• 3.3 Subjective Value Regarded as Intrinsic

4. GIBBARD'S NORM-EXPRESSIVISM

5. METAETHICAL ASPIRATIONS

• 5.1 Are There Normative Facts?
• 5.2 Premature Dismissal of Natural Representation
• 5.3 Justifying Claims of Accuracy and Objectivity
• 5.4 Explaining the Conceptual Relations Among Ethical Systems
• 5.5 You Can't Get Here from There
• 5.6 Origins of Normative Governance
• 5.7 The Evolution of Motivation and Judgment
• 5.8 Mechanisms of Judgment
• 5.9 A Naturalistic Fallacy for Ordinary Normativity

6. APPLYING GENERAL STANDARDS FOR GALILEAN EXPLANATION

• 6.1 'That' vs. 'How' Explanations
• 6.2 A Hijacked Rationality
• 6.3 Galilean Gaps in Gibbard's Psychology

7. IS GIBBARD'S VIEW PSEUDO-GALILEAN?

• 7.1 Signs of Anthropocentrism and Mistaken Essentialism
• 7.2 Evidence that Value is Subjective for Gibbard
• 7.3 A Case Against Subjective Value as Intrinsic Value

8. A BETTER THEORY

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

APPENDIX

• A         NORMS, PRINCIPLES, RULES, AND GOALS