The key question is this: Wherein lies the intrinsic validity of a human value? Philosophers of the subjectivist schools argued that it was in the experience of felt or intuited value that validity resided; experienced values were "given." Sociobiologists maintain that a value is an evolved feedback mechanism which, because we act in response to it, aids in our survival; its validity lies in the fact that it exists, having proved its worth over countless generations of natural selection. Materialists have assumed a sort of middle ground, such that Thomas Jefferson was able to assert both that happiness is the goal of life and that we have a natural instinct for social concern (Sellars et al., 1949, p. 64). Roy Wood Sellars spoke of the general good as "an absolute principle" (p. 69), of moral principles as "irreducible to non-moral terms" (p. 71), and of how democratic norms (p. 72)

turn on the absolute principle of the moral dignity of human beings. This absolute principle seems to me irreducible. Its base is the natural and inevitable demand of self-conscious personality to receive just social recognition. And it flows from the moral inadequacy of any other principle, such as that of moral aristocracy. I consider social Darwinism as the last abortive attempt to confuse biology and morals.

Of course, the sociobiologists have since then attempted (successfully, I would argue) to connect morals to their biological origins (Ruse, 1984), using game theory to great advantage. Evolution of our social mechanisms involved specialized male and female roles, food sharing (necessary for hunters), and cooperative behaviors such as "kin selection" and "reciprocal altruism." These latter are frequently misunderstood, as Ruse and Wilson (1986) explain: "It must be recognized that this is now a technical biological term, and does not necessarily imply conscious free giving and receiving.... Rather, human beings function better if they are deceived by their genes into thinking that there is a disinterested objective morality binding upon them, which all should obey. We help others because it is 'right' to help them and because we know that they are inwardly compelled to reciprocate in equal measure."

To be fair, some philosophers are talking more frankly of the evolutionary origins of values, as does Humanist philosopher Paul Kurtz (Kurtz, 1988, pp. 98-9); yet our values must appear to be far enough removed from their origins to warrant treatment as fundamental, for he maintains (p. 19) that Humanist ethics are "based on man's own perception of good and evil ..." and that the meaning of life (p. 240) "is found within living itself, as it reaches out to create new conditions of experience."

To complicate matters, the values we evolved as tribal savannah-dwellers are quite inadequate to the complex social, cultural and technological enviornment we have created for ourselves. To illustrate:

My daughter is kidnapped; $1,000,000 is demanded for her safe return. Polling my inherited internal values, I find there is no contest: Do anything to get her back. I pay, and the message the kidnappers (and copycats) get is, "I'll pay you handsomely to threaten my daughter's life." They are only too happy to repeat the favor, but they already have all my money. So another victim is chosen. When will someone break this vicious cycle by recognizing that the only way to prevent extortion is never to make it profitable? We can't wait for evolution to play out the applicable game theory; we must do it ourselves. And we must do so by understanding the true bases of values, and incorporating them into our culture.

Ethics is based not on the values we feel but on our ability to choose, consciously, among them -- and on the almost constant need to do so. The present state of the world bespeaks our frequent inadequacy to the task. Our remote forebears, when faced with conflicting values, simply followed the strongest emotion. Enter the enlarged cerebral cortex of Homo sapiens, which offered the tremendous benefit of parallel processing -- checks and balances on our lymbic system. (What space shuttle would go up without its two computers to correct each other's errors?) With its ability to recognize increasingly long-range consequences of action, the cerebral cortex usurped the control of the older automatic system.

What, then, can serve as the basis for a more objective system of ethics, based on conscious understanding of the evolutionary origins and purposes of our inherited values?

Ayn Rand wrote that the only fundamental alternative is existence or non-existence, which alternative applies only to living organisms seeking continued existence; from this all other values (those things we seek to gain and to keep) are derived (Rand, 1964). I would amend that only by pointing out that (1) conservation laws allow matter and energy to change form, but not to disappear altogether -- so the alternative applies to form only; and (2) certain non-living forms persist (e.g., galaxies). I will also depart immediately from her focus on the individual organism as the seat of values, for "the fundamental attribute of life is ... not that it ekes out an individual existence for a while, but that it spans generations. Where would we be if our most remote microbe ancestor had merely existed -- or even if it had developed music, art and philosophy -- and then failed to reproduce?" (Van Cleave, 1988a).

The purpose of life is to continue. The more kinds of life populate the universe, the better they thrive and scatter throughout the galaxies, the better life will have fulfilled its purpose. We, however, have our own notions of purpose, all of which are completely anthropocentric. It is time that we understood that we will serve ourselves best by stressing our deepest value -- the welfare of our remote descendants -- and accepting the evolutionary purpose of life as our own.

Some of our ethical problems derive from wounded self-esteem. Explains Rom Harré (Miller, 1983, p. 166), "From what one knows about cultures of the past and remote cultures of the present, from history and anthropology, the search for honor and the humiliation occasioned by the loss of it seems to be a recurring, dominant, human theme; the institutions that subserve this, the ritual devices by which honor is lost or gained, the rituals by which such losses and gains are publicly acknowledged to have been achieved, these are the institutions which one finds in almost every culture, however inverted, subverted or perverted they may be." Whether we call it "honor," "status," "face" or "machismo," we're talking about self-esteem -- and in a sense that treats it as a primary value, not as the guidance mechanism is was designed to be.

Consider: We possess a complement of epigenetic values suited to an individual's pursuit of reproductive success. The first component of this is strictly individual, concerned with satisfying the appetites that induce appropriate behavior. This individual component was pursued by exercising personal power, finding one's place in the social hierarchy, and accepting it. That social status was the measure of one's "honor" in the tribe. One could improve one's social position only by demonstrating superior personal strength. Today, we operate under the interesting notion that all men should strive to attain equ and that we have acourse) honor with respect to all others. Acceptance of a lower social position in deference to superior strength, including ritual submission, is the norm among our primate cousins, and most probably is our own remote tradition -- but it is deplored by modern man.

Things have changed; innate personal strength no longer holds sway. Now anyone with a pistol can eliminate his "social superiors" in their sleep. Personal, innate power has given way to acquired, artificial power. Moreover, mental ability, with its concomitant advantages of adaptability (abstractly, excellence of variety) and versatility (variety of excellence) has replaced physical strength as our most important individual survival tool. For these reasons, power is no longer an appropriate determinant of reproductive success. It must be replaced by rational assessment and reproductive choice. Additionally, the measure of self-esteem can no longer be the power one holds; we must noww accept performance in service to mankind's future as the badge of social status.

Further, an ultra-democratic climate prevails today, in which everyone is deemed to deserve equal success in all aspects of life -- reproductive, professional, social, even recreational. The focus is on the qualitative experience of life via the mechanisms that were evolved for our survival, treating them not as guidance mechanisms but as goals in themselves. This is perversion in the true sense of the word. The resulting hedonistic excesses serve only to divert attention from the real business of life: preparing the optimum genetic and cultural legacy for our remote descendants, conserving the resources they'll need for a good life, and nurturing other life, both as part of our descendants' birthright, and as worthy of continuation in its own right.

To make matters worse, the misplaced focus on individual self- indulgence diminishes the quality of social interactions, and this results in a "disconnectedness" from life -- an existential angst. This can manifest itself as suicidal depression (primarily in NF types) or even psychopathic agression (mostly in NT types). We should note that SJ types are so motivated by duty as to be unattracted by hedonism, and SPs are so prone to hedonism as to escape the "disconnectedness" mentioned here, but many of them (along with disillusioned NFs) will end up as victims of drug and alcohol abuse in a desperate attempt to regain the "I'm OK" feeling (for SJs, peer acceptance; for SPs, simply feeling alive) that could have been theirs as members of a caring, productive society.

A backlash effect directed against such hedonism is quite apparent in our society today. It is spearheaded by idealists (NF types) and opportunists (charismatic SP performers -- which goes some way toward explaining why televangelists are so frequently involved in moral scandal), and supported by traditionalists (SJs). Its focus is rigidly authoritarian, often fanatical -- and if allowed to achieve political ascendency, can be expected to be totalitarian.

Hedonism and the associated backlash are readily apparent to us; another result of this exaggeraged egalitarianism is not so apparent: The ends of evolution are no longer being served. Excellence must stand aside for mediocrity. The disadvantaged deserve their place in the sun. "Security for all" is the motto. "Interestingly, Homo sapiens is the only known species that actively promotes the survival of its weakest members (not counting infants) -- those who would normally be reclaimed by an impersonal Mother Nature. Indeed, there is even a 'leveling' effect whereby outstanding ability in an individual, while still attractive to mates, is met by concerted antagonism by others less amply endowed." (Van Cleave, 1985). Our inherited, limited notion of personal reproductive success is simply to prefer our own children to anyone else's, and to ignore any contribution that strangers might make to our descendants' success.

This is the most troublesome ethical issue we face: Do we abandon all hope of improving the human species, and actively encourage the propagation of deleterious genes in the name of equality? To many, this very question will reek of fascism; the memory of Nazi "eugenics" is too horribly fresh. But the Social Darwinism of the 1940s was an abomination not because it advocated progressive eugenics but because it buried variety, restricted security and distorted excellence in the formulation of its goals. "Having abandoned natural selection, we must take upon ourselves the task of understanding and guiding our own development as a species -- and, eventually, into diverging species populating the universe. Select for or against traits by genetic input, natural or artificial; culling is unnecessary and brutal. Versatility, adaptability and purposeful divergence are the cardinal guiding principles." (Van Cleave, 1987a).

With the emerging capabilities for genetic testing of embryos, and the promise of a future mastery of "custom genetic design," we will be able to guide the genetic development of our species without infringing on human rights. All that remains (and I hope the intended irony penetrates) is for us to decide what constitutes desirable variety and excellence. The ubiquitous question, "But who will decide?" is easily answered: It shouldn't matter. Don't trust individuals, tempted to pursue their own short-term personal advantage, to make the decisions; rather, create a policy directed toward long-term development of the triadaptors among humanity -- one so clear and complete that anyone can administer it and no one can abuse it. The most important keys will be (1) never to deny the rights of life and reproductive choice to responsible adults, (2) to foster a sense of communal interest in, and responsibility for, the entire human gene pool, and (3) never to exclude either excellence or variety from our design of future man (or of any other organism we may be breeding); for when excellence is proved false, variety provides the ability to start over.

The other component of epigenetic values is social, whereby we superimpose nurturing and helpful behavior toward kin (and reciprocal altruism) over the more basic appetites -- sharing food rather than eating it all, for example. An important aspect of this is a shared tribal identity, which accounts for the "Us vs. Them" conflicts in society today: xenophobia, gang wars, labor/management disputes, racism and nationalism. One aspect of this, interestingly, may have had an evolutionary benefit: By accentuating group differences that led to less interbreeding, this mechanism produced increasingly different sub-species, adding to the overall variety of organisms, each specially equipped to deal with a set of local environmental conditions. In the event of catastrophe, this diversity increased the odds that something would survive.

An important conclusion: While there may be an evolutionary explanation behind feelings of racism, there is no rational basis for them to persist. Good genes can come from any source, and it is stupid to reject excellence on the grounds of emotional bias. "Race pollution" and miscegenation are completely false issues. But there is another side to the coin: We may, as a multi-racial world society, decide that speciation is in our collective best interest. The existing differences among races are a natural place to start a program of intentional divergence. Should we? Will we? Perhaps in fifty years we will know.

What of nationalism? Some people talk of national honor, which is merely the shared sense of individual honor as members of the tribe, and beyond that has no significance. The signal accomplishment of nationalism is to expand the scope of "Us vs. Them" confrontations, involving more people, protracting the duration of conflict and increasing the carnage. Short-sighted scrapping over territory, resources, or (most idiotically) ideology is truly an embarrassment to humankind. Every individual has a personal reproductive stake in promoting the eventuation of this scenario: A world in which the wealthy wisely -- and voluntarily -- use their resources to create global peace and prosperity, where variety and excellence in their limitless forms can emerge in healthful, nurturing environments, to be identified and propagated for the benefit of all our descendants. A world in which, if my cousin shares my abilities but not my liabilities, I accept his children as my investment in the future, and refrain from selfishly perpetuating the very things that have limited my own life.

"If each of us holds as our first priority the welfare of our remote descendants (or those of our families, in the case of the childless), it becomes impossible to behave irresponsibly with regard to the entire human race. For Vladimir in Soviet Georgia may provide the genes for the longer life grandson Billy will enjoy; Giuseppe of Venice may pass on his musical genius to granddaughter Denise in Zurich; and Carlos of Guatemala may arrive in the U.S. just in time to save your great-granddaughter from a speeding car." (Van Cleave, 1986a).

The most important cultural invention of mankind is civilization. It arose because of the frequent interaction of members of different tribes, and the concomitant need to guard against abuses of power where kinship bonds could not provide an epigenetic deterrent and reciprocal altruism proved too tenuous a guide for behavior. In order to provide this security, enforcement power was vested in government of some type. One obvious problem with this arrangement is that people who wield such power often like to keep it, and will often go to great lengths to do so.

Nonetheless, there remain two legitimate and important functions of government: National defense (while nationalism persists) and civil justice. "The ethics of Objectivism, as propounded by Ayn Rand, center on the concept that one man may not initiate the use of force against another.... Raising fists and pointing guns to get one's way are verboten. This admits the exercise of force by government only as redress in situations where force has been improperly initiated, either by one citizen against another, or by another government against itself. No prior restraint is permitted." (Van Cleave, 1986b). This is a good starting point, though we must remember B.F. Skinner's admonition (Skinner, 1971) that subtler forms of control exist. "One can, for example, create a situation in which another individual wants to behave as one wishes. Madison Avenue exists as a result. One can also manipulate rewards in such a fashion as to exploit a willing worker, as with certain reprehensible piecework operations." (Van Cleave, 1986b).

I have been working on a model for a non-adversary legal system, which is too involved to admit detailed exposition here; its central fixture, however, is this: The voluntary contractual association of individuals, perhaps even internationally, who all agree to a code of ethics governing their interactions, who all agree to submit periodically to the equivalent of polygraph examination (which is currently based on outmoded psychology and technology, and could, I believe, be consistently reliable in the next five years), affirming that they have adhered to that code in their dealings with other subscribers, and who all agree to binding arbitration regarding disputes and ethical violations. This system would not immediately replace civil justice in government, but would complement it. Subscribers, confident both that their own transgressions will be discovered and that the same applies to their associates, will no longer be tempted to seek unfair advantage. Win-win strategies will govern business and personal interactions. Trust will re-emerge as a genuine element of commercial and social exchange. Reduced legal costs, increased profits and improved morale among participants will quickly induce others to join. Those who don't subscribe will find their motives suspect and their business volume reduced accordingly. Similar associations would spring up everywhere, developing reciprocal agreements among themselves similar to today's extradition laws.

The legal system in the U.S. has been working at cross- purposes. Simultaneous concern for the rights of both plaintiffs and defendants -- a necessary attribute of justice -- has been handled inappropriately.

Evidence obtained illegally is excluded from consideration, in hopes that by doing so we will reduce the temptation for law enforcement officers to violate the rights of suspects. The time to reduce that temptation is in the hiring and training of officers. Applicants who see police work as an opportunity to exercise personal power (mostly SP types) are not temperamentally suited for such work. Applicants who want to serve the community (mostly SJ types) can be screened for prejudices that might impair their judgment, then trained in the importance of proper procedure. Exclusionary restrictions on evidence can be relaxed when such evidence is obtained in good faith; violations of suspects' rights should be dealt with as separate issues. This principle of requiring temperamental suitability for jobs of power and responsibility can be extended to the rest of government and the private sector.

The reliability of testimony must be completely reexamined. We now know that memory can be easily and permanently altered by suggestion (Loftus, 1979). We also know that any attempt by the subject to evaluate his memories can alter them as well. It is ironic that testimony under hypnosis, which has been frequently rejected because of this same "pollution" through suggestion, offers the best hope for bypassing the brain's evaluative mechanism to provide unadulterated descriptive testimony through skillful questioning.

There simply isn't room here to cover all the areas of law enforcement and criminal justice that need revision. The basic principles, however, are:

1. Eliminate all but the most necessary laws pertaining to wrongful use of power.
2. Develop the many non-injurious methods of verifying testimony with involuntary neurophysical responses, and use them to (a) guarantee through regular examination that law enforcement and judicial functionaries are operating in good-faith pursuit of justice, and (b) decide both the question of a suspect's guilt or innocence and the question of appropriate punishment, primarily from examination (using questions accepted as pertinent, non- suggestive and truth-seeking by advocates on both sides, by the professional examiner and by the judge) of the suspect himself (using additional witnesses as needed).

Reflex outcries against this proposal on grounds of violated freedom and dignity should be critically examined in light of the psychological meanings of the words (Skinner, 1971) and the comparative violations of those values under our current system.

The most disturbing of these power issues is this: Covert truth-verifying technology, operable in secret and at a distance, will be available in a few short years. Who will use it? If we do nothing, that technology will be used by those who have power (the forces of governments, religions, businesses and organized crime) to maintain, consolidate and extend it, and organized resistance will be impossible. Who could stir up rebellion when his own thoughts are betraying him?

"The answer to this threat lies not in diminishing technology, but in redefining the relationship among power, responsibility and freedom. Traditionally (and practically), increased power brings increased freedom and lip service to increased responsibility, which is actually (and assiduously) avoided.

"Beyond basic guarantees of freedom, there must be an inverse relationship between power and freedom; the greater the power, the more carefully constrained it must be. A direct relationship between power and responsibility is then automatically assured. Such constraints must be voluntarily accepted by those who seek public positions of power, must guide criminal and civil justice, and can also be applied in business and in private." (Van Cleave, 1967).

There are many who believe that government should also provide for the economic security of everyone. I believe they are gravely mistaken. By making individual security the province of government we risk becoming like the over-protective mother who, protecting her child from all discomfort and danger, raises it to become a completely helpless adult. C. Judson Herrick (Sellars et al., 1949, pp. 227, 230) explains that successful adaptations are of two types: individually modifiable (excellence or variety is expressed in individual ability) or totalitarian (excellence or variety is expressed in group function): "In the development of every living body and every social group there are these two trends which are in some respects antagonistic; namely, progressive differentiation of parts with local autonomy, and, opposed to this, the necessity for maintenance of the integrity of the individual. Successful living depends on progressive development in both directions in proper balance."

I believe that our natural inclination for social interaction along epigenetic guidelines is sufficient to bind society together and to guarantee our concern for mutual security; there is no need for the establishment of redundant government policy. Furthermore, government is not only notoriously inefficient at providing social services, but it rarely avoids worsening the damaged self-images of those whom it is supposed to help. Worse, it can engage in no social programs without first taking money from the public -- and invariably ends up wasting most of it in the bargain. But worst of all, reliance on government social programs actually destroys the natural social concern of taxpayers who, angry at high taxes, resent the anonymous beneficiaries of expensive social programs, for whom they can muster no sense of compassion or empathy.

Private charity, based upon our deeply ingrained fellow- feeling and strengthened by the personal interaction and warmth between benefactor and beneficiary in a genuine exchange of concern and gratitude, is the only truly constructive mechanism to deal with the problems of those in distress.

This is one of two areas where I disagree with the prevailing humanist ethical tradition. Humanism advocates guarantees (through government appropriation, distribution and enforcement, one must presume) of a huge catalog of "human rights" related to equality of success for all people. I think I have shown that this involves a mistaken focus on the quality of individual experience, which is more properly a goal to be sought on one's own with the informal, personal, voluntary support of others.

The other (minor) ethical dispute I have with the current expression of humanism is what I perceive as a somewhat chauvinistic stress on human values. Evolutionary philosophy implies a set of values based on life in the abstract, which we might call "panvitalism." I call this a minor dispute, because I expect that humanists will automatically (for the most part) find themselves in agreement with me, resolving the dispute nicely.